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all things being equal, domestic arranger certification should result in lower loan spreads
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, project finance (PF) has become an increasingly popular
vehicle for channelling capital into emerging markets (Gatti et al., 2013). In 2017, the
total value of global PF transactions was worth $229.6 billion, based on data compiled
by Thomson Reuters Deals Intelligence (Thomson-Reuters, 2017). Approximately $80.6
billion (35%) of these deals were undertaken in emerging markets to finance long-term
infrastructure projects in transportation, water and sewage, power, oil and gas and min-
eral explorations. As Ansar (2012) points out, the surge in the use of PF in emerging
markets is partly underpinned by an increasing involvement of homegrown, and often
state-backed, financial intermediaries (FIs).
According to Esty (2014), a PF transaction “...involves the creation of a legally inde-
pendent project company financed with nonrecourse debt (and equity from one or more
corporations known as sponsoring firms) for the purpose of financing investment in a sin-
gle purpose capital asset, usually with a limited life.” Financing is secured on the basis of
the underlying project’s ability to generate enough cash flow for repayment. This absolves
the sponsors from any future liability arising from project failure. PF deals are typically
structured as syndicated loans, led by one or more mandated lead arrangers (MLAs).
The role of the lead arranger in PF is particularly critical since the loan is nonrecourse.
The lead arranger is appointed by the sponsors through a competitive tendering process
(Della Croce and Gatti, 2014) and principally responsible for undertaking due diligence.
The lead arranger also examines the project company’s network of contracts and invites
participant lenders to provide a share of the PF loan.
The non-involvement of syndicate members in the due diligence process induces asym-
metric information at the level of the lead arranger (Focarelli et al., 2008). The lead ar-
ranger is an “informed lender” who is able to monitor and learn about the firm through
unobservable and costly effort whereas potential participant lenders in the syndicate are
“uninformed lenders” who rely on the information and monitoring provided by the in-
formed lender to make profitable investment in firms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). To
overcome the problem of moral hazard at the lead arranger level, given that informed
lender effort is unobservable, the lead arranger must retain a stake in the borrowing
firm to reassure the syndicate members that the firm will behave diligently. When the
borrower requires more intense investigation and monitoring, the lead arranger retains a
larger portion of the loan to commit to exerting costly effort. Another possible solution
to this moral hazard problem is reputation.
Lead arrangers that retain a larger portion of the loan or reputable lead arrangers
communicate a meaningful signal (see Brealey et al., 1977) about the project’s true value
and the lead arranger’s commitment to monitoring, especially when dealing with new
or information-sensitive borrowers (Drucker and Puri, 2007). Thus, the lead arranger
facilitates a reduction in the loan spread through a reduction in search and information
costs and the alignment of the lead arranger’s incentives with that of other members
of the syndicate. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Sufi (2007), Chaudhry and Kleimeier
(2015), and Lee and Mullineaux (2004) provide empirical evidence that the syndicate
structure is less concentrated with arrangers syndicating a greater portion of the loan
when the borrowing firm is public, the loan amount is large, and the arranger has a
strong reputation. Vu and Skully (2008), Ivashina (2009), and Nini (2004) show that
loan spreads are lower when the arranger discloses more information to the syndicate
members, holds a higher share of the loan, has a strong reputation, and is local. Kleimeier
and Chaudhry (2015) find that foreign arrangers in the US syndicated loan market hold
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high lending shares to overcome moral hazard driven by higher information and effort
costs. They show, however, that previous interactions between borrowers and arrangers
can reduce moral hazard, hence culturally distant arrangers are able to form diffused
syndicates.
A number of studies investigate arranger certification in securities underwriting.1 Un-
derwriter syndication is used to credibly commit against opportunistic behavior (the
possibility of banks using their lending-generated relationship to benefit themselves and
the issuing firm at the expense of investors) and to exploit their inside knowledge to lower
issuance costs for borrowing firm issuers (Narayanan et al., 2004). However, explaining
certification as an application of the inside knowledge of the certifying agent obtained
through prior transactions with the issuer is probably not a valid argument for PF (Gatti
et al., 2013). This is because PF involves a newly established project that is operationally
separate from the sponsors. In PF, as Gatti et al. (2013, p.2) argue, “the ability to certify
arises from the superior ability of the arranging bank to structure and screen the deal
set up by the sponsors, as well as to later monitor the loan contract or resolve financial
distress situations.” Hence, Gatti et al. (2013) examine lead arranger certification specifi-
cally in the context of PF lending. Using a sample of 4,122 project finance loans arranged
from 1991 to 2005, they find that PF loan spreads are significantly lower for loans ar-
ranged by “prestigious” arrangers (banks that have a high market share in the PF loan
market in the year or years prior to the signing date of the loan) as compared to loans
arranged by nonprestigious lead arrangers. Furthermore, they show that participating
banks, rather than PF sponsors, “pay” for the certification provided by prestigious banks
by allowing them to keep larger fractions of upfront arranging fees.
This paper builds on the work of Gatti et al. (2013) and empirically examines the
causal effect on loan pricing of certification by domestic lead arrangers in emerging mar-
kets.2 We hypothesize that the domestic certifying agent has informational advantages
in accessing so-called “soft information”, that is, information which is difficult to com-
pletely summarize in a numeric score (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). As Corielli et al.
(2010) show, lenders in PF rely on the network of “nonfinancial contracts” (see Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) as a mechanism to control agency costs
and project risks.3 The literature on foreign banking, which focuses primarily on the
activities of foreign banks in emerging markets (e.g. Giannetti and Ongena, 2012) and
emphasizes the informational disadvantages faced by foreign banks provides arguments
and evidence in support of this hypothesis. Foreign banks have less local, market or firm
specific information than their domestic counterparts and must also overcome cultural
1These studies support the proposition that certification reduces loan prices, especially when commer-
cial banks, rather than investment banks, are the certifying agents. This is attributed to the commercial
bank’s ability to use private information about the issuing firm obtained from a pre-existing lending re-
lationship to reduce search and information costs (Puri, 1996, 1999; Gande et al., 1997). Other studies,
however, argue in favor of certification by investment banks due to the potential conflict of interest that
may arise when a commercial bank certifies a low quality project in order to use the proceeds of the issue
to draw down its existing loans with a lender (Kroszner and Rajan, 1997). Commercial bank certifica-
tion may also lead to the so-called “lock up” of the borrower. In other words, the commercial bank can
successfully prevent the borrower from being able to choose an alternative lead arranger (Kanatas and
Qi, 1998; Puri, 1999).
2In this study we define a domestic arranger as a FI that is ultimately owned by shareholders domiciled
in the same country as the project country and is not a subsidiary of a foreign parent company.
3Nonfinancial contracts are contracts that generate cash inflows or outflows that affect the unlevered
free cash flows of the project company.
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and bureaucratic barriers in the host country (see Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Buch, 2003;
Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Mian, 2006). Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) find that loan
spreads are increasing in the geographical distance between borrowers and lenders due
to the difficulty in obtaining and verifying soft information over distances. Degryse and
Ongena (2005) and Mian (2006) report similar findings.
In PF, we posit that the disadvantages faced by foreign banks in the project country
give domestic arrangers superior ability to assess projects and their underlying network of
contracts, credibly communicate the project’s true value, and provide effective monitoring
of the project company. If this hypothesis is correct, loans can be arranged at lower
spreads by domestic arrangers (with or without the participation of foreign arrangers)
than by foreign arrangers alone.
We test this conjecture using a sample of 1,270 PF syndicated loan tranches signed
across 53 emerging markets between 1998 and 2011 and worth over $300 billion.4 We
merge market data on PF deals from the ProjectWare database by Dealogic with owner-
ship data on the lead arrangers and lenders participating in the loan syndicate obtained
from the Bankscope and Zephyr databases (Bureau van Dijk). We use the information
on global ultimate ownership contained in the Bankscope database to categorize the FIs
in our sample as domestic or foreign with reference to the project country. We use the
Zephyr database on merger and acquisitions to identify FIs that experienced a change
in ownership over the period under consideration. In order to categorize those FIs that
underwent ownership change over the sample period as domestic or foreign we consider
the FI’s global ultimate owner at the time the PF loan was signed.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on certification in at least three
ways.5 First, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to investigate the
pricing effect of certification by domestic lead arrangers specifically in the context of PF
loan syndication. In doing so, the paper builds on the work of Gatti et al. (2013) on
the effect of prestige on certification in PF lending.6 The paper also builds on the work
of Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) on the differential effect of certification by domestic
vs. foreign banks in syndicated lending. The latter find that domestic arrangers and
foreign arrangers behave differently with foreign banks charging a higher spread (after
controlling for borrower and loan characteristics) in large as compared to small financial
markets in Europe.7
Second, the paper uses a switching regression model with endogenous switching to
account for the potential endogeneity of the arranger’s selection. The findings of Hasel-
4See the Methodology section for a discussion of how a country is selected as an emerging market.
5The paper also contributes to the wider literature on the role of FIs as delegated monitors à la
Diamond (1984) where the lead arranger is charged with monitoring the firm. Our analysis provides new
insight into whether, in the context of PF lending, domestic arrangers are better delegated monitors of
project companies than foreign arrangers.
6A domestic arranger can also be a prestigious arranger, for instance if it succeeds in exploiting a
home advantage to build profitable market share over the long run. However, only a total of 6 domestic
arrangers in our sample can also be categorized as prestigious, according to the league table of the top 25
PF lead arrangers published in Gatti (2013, pp. 175-178). These arrangers are Gulf International Bank
(Bahrain) and Chiao Tung Bank (China) for the period 1998-2005, and State Bank of India (India), Axis
Bank (India), IDBI Bank (India), and Korea Development Bank (Korea) for the period 2006-2011.
7Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) find that in large financial systems foreign banks tend to lend to
significantly more leveraged borrowers than domestic banks and take on especially risky projects. Foreign
banks diversify these risks by international syndication. In contrast, in small financial markets, foreign
arrangers go to larger and often publicly listed firms with more tangible assets.
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mann and Wachtel (2011) show that the involvement of a foreign or domestic bank as lead
arranger in a loan syndicate may not be random. The domestic FI’s superior knowledge
of the borrower’s country and of local market conditions (Berger et al., 2001; Mian, 2006)
suggests domestic arrangers may have a comparative advantage in dealing with project
companies that require more due diligence and monitoring. Domestic arrangers can also
help mitigate political risks associated with the project. Domestic FIs often have stronger
political connections with the government of the borrower’s country, making it difficult
for the latter to take actions that jeopardise the viability of PF investments, especially
when the FI is state-owned (Esty, 2004).
Third, the paper focuses specifically on PF syndicated loans in emerging markets,
which account for a significant and rapidly growing share of the global PF market. Car-
rying out due diligence in emerging markets can be more difficult since, by definition,
institutions are nascent and information frameworks less developed. Furthermore, emerg-
ing markets are more prone to macroeconomic shocks as well as country and political risks
(Dailami and Leipziger, 1998). Hence, this paper provides new insight into an important
function of intermediation in developing economies.
We find that certification by domestic arrangers causes a reduction in the loan spread
by 24 basis points on average (after controlling for project and loan characteristics, and
the potential endogeneity of the arranger’s selection). Given that in our sample loan
tranches arranged by foreign arrangers have an average size of $199 million, domestic
arranger certification would have translated into an average reduction in the cost of debt
of approximately $4.8 million per tranche for these loans, thus demonstrating its economic
value.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines some important institu-
tional features of PF syndicated lending. Section 3 discusses the methodology. Section 4
reports our empirical results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Institutional features of PF syndicated lending
PF is the incorporation of a capital venture as a stand-alone investment with equity
from sponsors and debt from lenders where the cash flows serve as the collateral for
repayment (Finnerty, 2013). Cash flows are ring-fenced through a complex network of
contracts to prevent any managerial discretion, thereby reducing conflict of interest and
agency cost (Subramanian and Tung, 2016).
There are three important characteristics that distinguish PF from venture capital
or corporate finance. First, a project company (also known as a special purpose vehicle
(SPV)) is created and given the legal mandate to design, construct and manage the
project separately from its sponsors (Corielli et al., 2010). Second, the creation of the
SPV gives rise to a set of contracts with third parties (often involving the sponsors as
well) managed and coordinated by the board of directors of the SPV, appointed by the
sponsors. Third, lenders provide the majority of capital (usually over 70%) on a limited
or nonrecourse basis typically through a syndicated structure led by a lead arranger
(Yescombe, 2011; Gatti, 2013; Esty, 2004). The lead arranger conducts due diligence
on the project company, its sponsors and counterparties, organizes the syndicate, and
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monitors the project company (Gatti et al., 2013).8 The selection of the lead arranger
often takes place through a competitive tendering process with individual FIs or consortia
of FIs tendering proposals to the project sponsors to act as lead arranger(s).9 When
choosing the lead arranger, the sponsors look for a FI that can successfully syndicate
the PF loan. This requires both distribution capability and the capability to certify the
project’s quality and risk (Gatti et al., 2013).
The syndication process involves three phases: pre-mandate, post-mandate and post-
signing. The pre-mandate phase starts with the negotiation and drafting of the prelimi-
nary terms and conditions of the loan agreement between the project company and the
MLA. The lead arranger must first conduct due diligence on the project company and the
project itself to certify the project’s true value and to ensure that relevant adverse inside
information is revealed prior to loan syndication. This is particularly difficult since the
project company has no prior operating history. Thus, the arranger has to access special-
ist engineering, legal, financial, logistical, market assessment, and risk assessment skills.
The lead arranger must then develop a complex system of rules and financial covenants
to monitor the project company’s actions after the loan closing and throughout the life
of the loan itself. This can be very challenging since many projects have extremely high
upfront costs, but then generate large free cash flow streams after the project is com-
pleted (Esty and Megginson, 2003). The MLA then signs a preliminary loan agreement or
“mandate” with the project company that specifies covenants, fees, and collateral. Next,
in the post-mandate phase, the lead arranger is responsible for the organization of the
syndicate. The MLA produces an information memorandum on the project company and
sends it to potential participant lenders. Lenders with previous and existing relationships
with the sponsors as well as those within the geographic reach of the project country are
more likely to be invited to form the syndicate. A roadshow is often organized where
potential participants are offered the opportunity to question the project company on any
aspects of the project. The lead arranger must be able to attract a sufficient number and
diversity of participating lenders to fund the PF loan at a price that is both low enough
to ensure project solvency and high enough to adequately compensate the lenders for the
risks they are taking by extending credit (Gatti et al., 2013). The lead arranger must
also design an optimal loan syndicate (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Focarelli et al., 2008;
Sufi, 2007) that can both deter strategic defaults (Esty and Megginson, 2003) and allow
for efficient renegotiation in case of liquidity defaults. Once the participant lenders in the
syndicate agree to fund part of the loan, the loan agreement is signed by all parties. Each
participant is responsible for a share of the loan and the terms of the loan are identical for
all syndicate members. The lead arranger, however, often holds a higher share of the loan
than any of the other participants. In addition to interest and commitment fee income,
the lead arranger receives a fee for arranging and managing the loan that is paid up-front
by the project company and can be shared by the lead arranger and other syndicate
members. In the post-signing phase, the lead arranger can also act as the agent bank for
8Lead arrangers can be commercial or investment banks but also insurance companies, pension funds,
private equity funds, and sovereign wealth funds. Multilateral financing agencies such as development
banks and export credit agencies (ECAs) can also act as lead arrangers, providing guarantees against
political and country risks (Gatti, 2013; Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012).
9François and Missonier-Piera (2007) suggest that multiple lead arrangers in loan syndicates are the
results of competitive advantages in various duties. They show that specialization helps split the costs
of managing the syndicate.
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the bank syndicate as a whole.10 The agent monitors the project company, governs the
terms of the loan, administers the drawdown of funds, calculates interest payments, and
enforces financial covenants.
Arranger certification in PF differs from arranger certification in corporate finance.
This is because while arrangers will naturally consider the balance sheets of the spon-
sors when structuring a corporate finance loan, this is irrelevant for PF lending due to
the limited or nonrecourse nature of the loan agreement. In spite of this, Kleimeier and
Megginson (2000) find that PF loans have lower spreads than many other types of syn-
dicated loans, suggesting that the unique institutional and contractual features of PF
and the underlying risk management process actually reduce default risk. Blanc-Brude
and Strange (2007) show that public-private partnerships (PPP) lenders only price major
risks, namely those driving the probability of default of the project, while managing other
risks at the project level through contract and project design. Corielli et al. (2010) find
that the use of nonfinancial contracts reduces loan spreads and increases debt-to-equity
ratios through a reduction in agency cost and cash flow volatility. Sorge and Gadanecz
(2008) find evidence of a positive non-linear hump-shaped term structure of PF loan
spreads that is attributed to specific characteristics of PF deals including the sequential
resolution of risks, and the availability of political risk guarantees.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
We obtain our data on PF syndicated loans using data from Dealogic’s ProjectWare
database. ProjectWare contains comprehensive information on PF transactions including
the loan contract characteristics, project company, sponsors and lenders. Importantly,
ProjectWare lists all the FIs involved in a given PF transaction. Each PF deal typically
involves several loan tranches. These loan tranches are the units of observation in our
analysis.11 This introduces dependence between our observations, that is, all the loan
tranches of a same deal are not independent of each other. Hence, we use robust standard
errors clustered at the deal level.
We extract data from ProjectWare on more than 14,000 PF deals signed between 1998
and 2011. However, a main drawback with the ProjectWare database is the unavailabil-
ity of data on loan spreads and fees for the majority of these deals. Thus, we are only
able to retrieve a sample of approximately 5,000 loan tranches where loan spread infor-
mation is available. We then filter out loan tranches that were not signed in emerging
markets. To select countries that qualify as emerging markets we use the following four
country list sources: the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, the FTSE Annual Country
Classification Review, the S&P Dow Jones Country Classification Consultation Results,
and the Russell Construction Methodology. This reduces our sample to approximately
2,000 loan tranches. To obtain a sample of syndicated loan tranches we filter out bilateral
agreement and club financing loan tranches. Our final sample comprises 1,270 syndicated
loan tranches (921 PF loan deals) arranged across 53 emerging markets between 1998 and
2011 and worth over $300 billion.
10The agent bank is not necessarily the lead arranger bank.
11It is a common feature in PF to structure a deal (e.g. bridge facility, revolving credit and term loans)
with more than one loan tranche. The loan tranches may differ in maturity and spread. However, since
these tranches fund the same deal they all reflect the deal’s underlying characteristics.
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We create a dummy variable that equals one when a domestic FI acts as a mandated
lead arranger in the loan syndicate and 0 otherwise. To contruct this dummy variable
we track for each loan tranche the global ultimate ownership of each FI listed as a lead
arranger using information on global ultimate owners (GUOs) contained in the Bankscope
database (Bureau van Dijk). We also identify any change in the lead arranger’s GUO
over the sample period using information on mergers and acquisitions contained in the
Zephyr database (Bureau van Dijk). Where this is the case, we classify the lead arranger
as domestic or foreign based on its GUO at the time the deal was signed.12
3.2. Description of the variables
Table 1 provides a description of all the variables used in the analysis. Loan spread
is the loan tranche spread over market base rates such as Libor, Euribor and US T-Bill.
This is in line with Corielli et al. (2010), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), and Gatti
et al. (2013). The loan spreads show some variation in their term structure. While most
of the loan tranches have spreads charged as a single rate above a market base rate, some
tranches are priced in tiers which correspond to various phases of the project such as
construction and operational phases. To obtain a single rate for the tranche we calculate
an average rate weighted by the number of years assigned to each tier of loan spread (see
Corielli et al., 2010).
Size, maturity, guarantees (where the loan tranche has explicit political risk guaran-
tees), refinance (where the loan tranche is to finance an on-going project), and currency
(loan tranches in a currency which is different from the currency of the project country)
are included to control for loan characteristics. We also control for the loan tranche type
(i.e, secured, short-term, credit facility, term loan, EXIM), the project industry [and ge-
ographic location], and the project country’s sovereign credit risk. The latter variable
is constructed using credit risk scores compiled by the Institutional Investor magazine
biannually (March and September) by means of interviews with economists from leading
investment banks worldwide. The survey responses are used to derive a ranking that
ranges from 1-100, with a higher score representing a better sovereign credit risk outlook.
This measure is often preferred to other sovereign credit risk measures because of its peri-
odic and forward looking nature as compared to measures released by rating agencies such
as Standard & Poor’s, Moody or Fitch. Finally, for the purpose of model identification
we consider the project country’s ratio of domestic arrangers to total arrangers and the
project country’s level of financial development (measured by private credit to GDP). 13
Data on private credit to GDP is obtained from the World Bank Financial Development
and Structure Database originally developed by Beck et al. (2000).
3.3. Model and estimation procedure
Domestic lead arrangers may be able to select projects of differing quality compared
to those selected by foreign lead arrangers. The effect is that the lead arranger’s distri-
bution across loan tranches may be non-random and systematically different within the
population. If this is true, the effect of certification by domestic arrangers on spreads
12Where there are multiple lead arrangers for a given loan tranche, we categorize the loan tranche as
arranged by a foreign arranger if all the lead arrangers without exception are foreign. Conversely, we
categorize the loan tranche as arranged by a domestic arranger if at least one of the lead arrangers is
domestic.
13Private credit to GDP is measured as the ratio of financial claims on the private sector by deposit
money banks and other financial institutions divided by GDP in constant US$.
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may not only measure domestic arranger certification, but may also indicate the ex ante
characteristics of the projects selected by domestic arrangers. Thus, we treat the lead
arranger’s selection as potentially endogenous to the loan spread. Endogeneity of the
arranger’s selection may originate from several sources. First, domestic FIs’ relatively su-
perior knowledge of the borrower’s country and of local market conditions (Berger et al.,
2001; Mian, 2006) suggests domestic arrangers may have a comparative advantage in
dealing with project companies that require more due diligence and monitoring. Second,
domestic arrangers can help mitigate political risks associated with the project. Domes-
tic FIs often have stronger political connections with the government of the borrower’s
country, making it difficult for the latter to take actions that jeopardize the viability of
a PF investment, especially when the FI is state-owned (Esty, 2004). Third, domestic
FIs may find it relatively more difficult than foreign FIs to fund large-scale investment
ventures on a continuous basis due to greater liquidity constraints.
The potential endogeneity of the lead arranger’s selection means that an ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimate of the effect of certification by domestic arrangers on the loan
spread may be biased. Our econometric approach takes this into account. We use the
switching regression model with endogenous switching developed by Maddala (1986a,b).
The basic model is composed of (i) a selection equation that determines which of the two
“regimes” (loan tranches involving at least one domestic lead arranger or loan tranches
involving only foreign lead arrangers) the loan tranche belongs to and (ii) two loan spread
equations for loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers and loan tranches arranged
by foreign arrangers, respectively. The lead arranger’s selection equation is specified as
Ii = αZi + µi (1)
where Ii is a binary variable, which equals 1 if for loan tranche i a domestic FI is a
mandated lead arranger, 0 otherwise. This can be summarized as
Ii = 1 if αZi + µi > 0
Ii = 0 if αZi + µi ≤ 0
The loan spread equations are specified as
y1i = β1X1i + ε1i (2)
y2i = β2X2i + ε2i (3)
where y1i (y2i) is the loan spread for loan tranche i if it is arranged by one or more
domestic arrangers (by foreign arrangers only). Zi, X1i and X2i are sets of overlapping
explanatory variables affecting both the arranger’s selection and the loan tranche spread,
with α, β1 and β2 the respective coefficients. In our study, these explanatory variables
are the loan tranche characteristics and the project country sovereign credit risk score as
well as project industry dummies. We also include the project country’s ratio of domes-
tic arrangers to total arrangers and the project country’s level of financial development
(measured by private credit to GDP) in the selection equation for the purpose of model
identification. In other words, we assume that these two variables only affect the loan
tranche spread through their influence on the domestic arrangers’ decision to certify. The
ratio of domestic arrangers to total arrangers captures the pool of domestic financial in-
termediaries available to arrange a loan tranche in the project country. When this ratio is
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high domestic financial intermediaries supply a larger fraction of funds in PF loans. The
level of financial development captures variation in financing capabilities. Together, the
two variables capture variation in capital costs, which are likely to vary over time as con-
ditions in the project countries’ savings and investment markets change. While these two
variables have been used to instrument arranger participation in previous studies (see,
for instance, Nini, 2004), we nonetheless formally examine the validity of our exclusion
restrictions in the robustness checks section below.
µi, ε1i and ε2i are the error terms and assumed to have trivariate normal distribution
with mean vector zero and covariance matrix shown below.
cov(µi, ε1i, ε2i) =





where σ2µ is the variance of the error term in the selection equation (which can be assumed
to be equal to 1 since α is estimable up to a scalar factor). σ21 and σ
2
2 are the variances of
the error terms of the loan spread equations (2) and (3). σ1µ is the covariance of µi and
ε1i. σ2µ is the covariance of µi and ε2i. σ12 is the covariance between ε1i and ε2i and is
not defined, as y1i and y2i are never observed simultaneously (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004).
The model controls for the potential endogeneity of the arranger’s selection using the
error terms of the selection and outcome (loan spread) equations. In other words, unob-
served characteristics that influence the arranger’s selection may also influence the loan
spread equations. Endogeneity of the arranger’s selection implies that the expectations
of the error terms for equations (2) and (3) conditional on the sample selection criterion
have non-zero values. This is specified below as








where F is a cumulative normal distribution function and f is a normal density distribu-
tion function.
The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) algorithm developed by
Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) to fit the endogenous switching regression model. The log















where ρ1 = σ
2
1u/σuσ1 is the correlation coefficient between ε1i and µi and ρ2 = σ
2
2u/σuσ2
is the correlation coefficient between ε2i and εµ. When the estimates of ρ1 and ρ2 are
statistically different from zero the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias in the
arranger’s selection cannot be rejected.
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3.4. Measuring the impact of domestic arranger certification
As discussed earlier, the potential endogeneity of the arranger’s selection means that
loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers in our sample may have systematically dif-
ferent characteristics from those arranged by foreign arrangers. Similarly, the error terms
in the loan spread equations may be expected to be different for loan tranches arranged
by domestic arrangers and loans tranches arranged by foreign arrangers. Therefore, we
cannot measure the effect of certification by domestic arrangers simply by comparing
the two conditional loan spreads obtained from estimating equations (2) and (3), as this
would not take into account the potential sample selection bias in the arranger’s selection.
We compute instead the conditional and counterfactual loan spreads for loans arranged
by foreign arrangers. The conditional loan spread is the loan spread for loan tranches
arranged by foreign arrangers given that the loan tranches were actually arranged by
foreign arrangers. In other words, this is the loan spread for loan tranches arranged by
foreign arrangers after controlling for the potential sample selection bias in the arranger’s
selection. This is shown below in equation (8)
E(y2i/Ii = 0, X2i) = β2X2i − σ2ρ2f(αZi)/{(1− F (αZi)} (8)
The counterfactual loan spread is the loan spread that would have been observed for
loan tranches arranged by foreign arrangers if these loan tranches involved one or more
domestic arrangers instead of only involving foreign arrangers. This is shown below in
equation (9)
E(y1i/Ii = 0, X1i) = β1X1i − σ1ρ1f(αZi)/{(1− F (αZi)} (9)
Based on the above, certification by domestic arrangers is valuable when the difference
between the counterfactual loan spread (9) and conditional loan spread (8) is negative and
statistically significant. Negative values indicate that certification by domestic arrangers
would have resulted in lower loan spreads.14
4. Empirical results
4.1. Comparison of loan tranches by type of arrangers
Table 2 provides a univariate comparison of loan tranches by type of arrangers. The
total size of loan tranches included in our sample is approximately $306 billion. Loan
tranches arranged by domestic arrangers are worth approximately $158 billion, while
those arranged by foreign arrangers are worth approximately $148 billion ($10 billion
less). Interestingly, there are more loan tranches arranged by foreign arrangers (744)
than by domestic arrangers (526) despite the fact that the total size of loan tranches
arranged by domestic arrangers is larger. This result indicates that foreign arrangers are
likely to use a relatively more diffused tranche structure to arrange loans.
The mean loan spread for the whole sample is 216 bps with a standard deviation of
185.9 bps. Loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers exhibit more variation (stan-
dard deviation of 232.7 bps) compared to those arranged by foreign arrangers (standard
14An alternative way of measuring the impact of domestic arranger certification is to compute the
conditional and counterfactual loan spreads for loans arranged by domestic arrangers. The counterfactual
loan spread in this case is the loan spread for loan tranches arranged by one or more domestic arrangers
had these loan tranches been arranged by foreign arrangers only. Thus, domestic arranger certification
is valuable if the counterfactual loan spread is greater than the conditional loan spread.
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deviation of 144.1 bps). The mean loan tranche maturity is 122 months (12.2 years) for
the whole sample with the longest tenor equal to 393 months (32.8 years). Similarly,
loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers have a mean tenor equal to 147.9 months
(12.3 years) compared to 103.8 months (8.7 years) for loan tranches arranged by foreign
arrangers. The mean loan tranche size for the whole sample is $241.2 million with the
highest tranche size worth as much as $6.8 billion. The mean size for loan tranches ar-
ranged by domestic arrangers is $301 million compared to $199 million for loan tranches
arranged by foreign arrangers.
The mean sovereign credit risk score for loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers
is 65.8, while it is 52.1 for those arranged by foreign arrangers. Thus, the loan tranches
involving domestic arrangers in our sample tend to be in countries perceived to have
lower sovereign risk. The mean ratio of private credit to GDP (our measure of financial
development) is equal to 61% for the whole sample with the highest value equal to 159.6%.
The mean ratio of private credit to GDP is equal to 85.2% for loan tranches arranged
by domestic arrangers compared to a mean ratio of 43.6% for loan tranches arranged
by foreign arrangers. Hence, loan tranches involving domestic arrangers tend to be in
countries that are relatively more financially developed.
4.2. Distribution of loan tranches
Table 3 shows the distribution of loan tranches by projects based on project indus-
try, project region and project country income level. Oil and gas, power and utility,
transportation, and telecommunication projects account for both the highest number
and largest size of loan tranches in the sample. These projects account for approxi-
mately 74% of the total size of the loan tranches, which suggests that most of the funded
projects in our sample are either energy or infrastructure related. Projects located in
South-East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America account together for 69% of the
total size of all the loan tranches in the sample. This is followed by projects in Eastern
Europe accounting for 15% of the total size. Projects in the Indian subcontinent (India
and Pakistan), Western Europe and Sub Saharan Africa together account for 16% of
the total size. There appears to be a polarization of projects in high-income emerging
economies, accounting for 50% of the total size of all the loan tranches.15 This is followed
by upper-middle- and lower-middle-income countries, which account for 32% and 17%,
respectively. Low-income countries only account for 1% of the total size.
Table 4 shows the distribution of loan tranches by type of arrangers. Infrastructure
projects like transportation, and water and sewage tend to involve relatively more do-
mestic arrangers. Extractive projects such as mining, oil and gas, power and utility,
as well as telecommunication projects tend to involve relatively more foreign arrangers.
This could be because infrastructure projects receive more active government support,
especially in countries such as Brazil and India (Ansar, 2012). Loan tranches arranged
by domestic arrangers are also typically larger in size than those arranged by foreign ar-
rangers. In terms of geographic location, more loan tranches are arranged by domestic ar-
rangers in the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia regions. The Sub-Saharan Africa,
Western Europe, and Eastern Europe regions, in constrast, have more loan tranches ar-
ranged by foreign arrangers. The Middle East and South East Asia regions recorded
the largest sizes for loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers ($63 billion and $44
15Countries are classified as high-income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and low income
based on the World Bank’s classification of countries by income.
12
billion, respectively). Latin America and Eastern Europe recorded the largest sizes for
loan tranches arranged by foreign arrangers ($47 billion and $34 billion, respectively).
The sample contains 293 loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers in high-income
emerging economies with a total size of $64 billion. In lower middle-income countries
there are only 82 loan tranches arranged by domestic arrangers with a total size of $25
billion. In low-income countries, however, not a single loan tranche involved any domestic
arrangers.
4.3. Determinants of domestic arranger selection
Table 5 reports the determinants of the domestic arranger’s selection based on the
selection equation of the endogenous switching regression model. The results show that
domestic arrangers are more likely to arrange large and short term loan tranches and less
likely to arrange loan tranches that are EXIM facilities. The coefficient on the tranche
amount variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level across all four
regressions. The coefficient of the short-term loan tranch dummy variable is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level once we control for the loan tranche type and
the project’s industry (Reg. 4). The finding that domestic arrangers appear to have a
preference for loan deals with shorter maturity suggests that domestic banks may want
to minimise long-term exposure to PF deals so as not to impact adversely on their other
lending activities. The finding that EXIM loans are relatively less likely to be arranged
by domestic arrangers as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient
on the EXIM loan tranche dummy variable in Reg. 3 and Reg. 4 supports our main
hypothesis. Domestic banks may be better able to cultivate connections with the host
government (see Mian, 2006), which can help mitigate political risks in PF. Since EXIM
loans are guaranteed by sovereign institutions from developed countries, the economic
value of domestic arranger certification may be much less significant for this particular
type of loans.
Turning to the variables used for the purpose of model identification, namely the
project country’s ratio of domestic arrangers to total arrangers and the project country’s
level of financial development, the coefficients on these two variables are statistically
significant across all four regressions. The positive and statistically significant coefficient
on the former suggests that a larger pool of domestic banks available to arrange PF
deals at the country level increases the proability that a domestic bank will act as lead
arranger in a given deal. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the
latter once we control for the loan tranche type and the project’s industry suggests a
negative relationship between domestic arranger certification and financial development.
This finding is somewhat intuitive. Financial development tends to be associated with
openness to foreign investors, which include foreign financial intermediaries. Thus, the
probability that a domestic bank acts as lead arranger in a PF deal reduces as the pool
of banks available to certify PF deals in the country gets larger through the inclusion of
foreign intermediaries. Furthermore, financial development also tends to be associated
with greater transparency. If our our main hypothesis is true, greater transparency may
reduce asymmetric information at the lead arranger level, thus reducing the economic
value of domestic arranger certification.
4.4. Loan spread regression results
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the loan spread regressions for loans arrranged
by domestic arrangers and foreign arrangers, respectively. As Table 6 shows, sovereign
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credit risk score is negatively associated with loan spread for loans arranged by domestic
arrangers. As expected, projects in higher ranked countries receive lower spreads. There
is also a negative association between currency and loan spread. This result is fairly
intuitive. Consider tranches denominated in US Dollars (USD), the USD equivalent
credit exposure on the SPV fluctuates with currency movements, which impacts on the
credit premium. As long as the loan is denominated in USD, the project company’s
exposure at default remains constant throughout the life of the loan. However, consider
now the same loan is provided in Ghanaian Cedi (GHS). In this case, the exposure at
default in USD depends on the exchange rate at the time of default. Last, the tranche
size variable indicates that larger loans receive slightly lower spreads. Loan size reflects
both the nature of the underlying project and its credit risk. Larger loans are typically
granted to less risky project companies. When the SPV is based in a developing country
and imports plants and equipment necessary to construct and operate the project, export
credit agencies (ECAs) can provide various forms of financing (direct lending, indirect
lending, and interest rate equalization) made available to them by their governments
to encourage exports of goods and services or offer political and business risk coverage.
The involvment of ECAs is captured in Reg. 3 and Reg. 4 by the EXIM loan tranches
dummy. The results show that EXIM loan tranches are associated with higher spreads
for loans arranged by domestic arrangers. This could reflect a relatively lower coverage
of the entire risk insured by ECAs offering their services to national banks in developing
countries.
Turning now to the results reported in Table 7, sovereign credit risk score and tranche
size are both associated with a decrease in loan spread for tranches arranged by foreign
arrangers. Hence, the effect of these two variables on loan spread remains unchanged
when compared to Table 6. While foreign capital is often less constrained than local
bank capital, in practice foreign financial intermediaries place country and borrower limits
on the exposure that their loan desks can take. These limits are allocated by product,
often resulting in loan specific country and borrower limits (Nini, 2004). This is further
supported by the negative and significant association between spread and both short-
term and EXIM tranche dummy variables for loans arranged by foreign arrangers. The
negative and significant coefficient on the EXIM dummy variable is consistent with the
findings of Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) and suggests that the political and/or business
risk insurance or guarantees that ECAs provide (when combined with certification by
foreign arrangers) is effective at reducing the financing cost. Moreover, the negative
association between currency and loan spread is comparatively weaker and less robust
for loan tranches arranged by foreign arrangers than for those arranged by domestic
arrangers. This is to be expected given that over 60% of the loan tranches in the sample
are denominated in US Dollars with approximately 75% of US Dollar-denominated loan
tranches arranged by foreign arrangers, typically international banks with large US Dollar
reserves.
Finally, we observe a positive (negative) association between refinance (credit facility)
and loan spread. This association, however, is no longer significant once we control for the
project’s industry. Overall, the findings reported in Tables 6 and 7 are broadly consistent
with those reported in a number of studies examining the determinants of PF loan spread
including inter alia Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Corielli et al. (2010) and Gatti et al.
(2013).
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4.5. Impact of domestic arranger certification on loan spread
The empirical estimates obtained from estimating Reg. 4, which are reported in
Tables 6 and 7, are used to construct conditional and counterfactual loan spreads for
loan tranches arranged by foreign arrangers using equations (8) and (9). The conditional
and counterfactual loan spreads are converted from their natural logarithm form to basis
points using the exponential function in order to compute the impact of certification by
domestic arrangers on loan spreads in basis points.16 The spread impact is computed as
the difference between the two expected loan spreads (conditional and counterfactual).
Table 8 reports the mean impact of domestic arranger certification on loan spreads
in basis points. The table also report median, 25th, and 75th percentile impact in basis
points. The results are all statistically significant at the 1% level. The table reports
impact by project industry, region and the country’s income level. The mean basis point
impact is -24 bps with 75th percentile impact of -44 bps. In other words, the mean loan
spread for loan tranches arranged by foreign arrangers would have been 24 bps lower if
these tranches had involved one or more domestic arrangers. The impact is highest for
mining projects with a mean impact of -99 bps and median impact of -66 bps. The 75th
percentile impact is relatively higher (-146 bps). This is followed by projects in water
and sewage, oil and gas, and industry and commercial projects. The projects where
the impact is lowest are power and utility, and petrochemical projects. Overall, we find
that domestic arranger certification has a positive impact on loan spread across all project
industries except transportation. While transport finance initiatives should be designed to
increase accessibility, capacity and performance, many investment projects are politically
instead of commercially driven. The involvement of domestic financial intermediaries in
the certification of such projects may increase the risk of political interference, leading to
a higher credit premium.
Turning to impact by geographic location, Sub-Saharan Africa is where the impact of
certification by domestic arrangers is the largest with a mean impact on spread of -112
bps and a 75th percentile impact of -126 bps. In Latin America, the Indian subconti-
nent, and Eastern Europe, the mean impact on spread is -99 bps, -71 bps and -40 bps,
respectively. The impact is lowest (-31 bps) in the Middle East. Overall, certification
by domestic arrangers appears to have a statistically and economically significant pricing
effect on loans everywhere except Western Europe, which in our sample only comprises
two countries: Greece and Israel.
Finally, for projects located in high-income emerging economies, the mean impact of
certification by domestic arrangers on spread is -26 bps with a median impact of -17 bps.
For projects located in upper middle-income countries, the mean impact is marginally
lower at -20 bps with a median impact of -22 bps. The largest impact of domestic arranger
certificatin on loan spread is found for projects located in lower income countries (mean
impact of -84 bps with a median value of -82 bps). The percentile values show that the
lowest impact is -61 bps and the highest impact is -116 bps. This finding is intuitive
since lower income countries are typically characterized by relatively greater information
asymmetry and country risk. Domestic arrangers in this context appear to be better able
to signal the project’s true value to other participants in the syndicate and reassure them
16Since the endogenous switching regression model is estimated using a natural logarithm function,
the empirical results and the conditional and counterfactual loan spreads are also in natural logarithm
form. We convert these spreads in basis points by computing the exponent of the estimates obtained
using the natural logarithm function.
15
that the project company will behave diligently.17
4.6. Robustness checks
The robustness of our results depends on the identification of appropriate exclusion
restrictions - i.e. instruments - in order to tackle the endogeneity problem that may
arise from selection bias in the lead arranger’s selection. Specifically, it is important to
employ instruments that are truly exogenous, that is, do not correlate with the error
term in the loan spread equation. Furthermore, it is also important to avoid the use of
weak instruments in the sense that the instruments do not significantly correlate with
the potentially endogenous variable (i.e. the lead arranger’s selection). The use of invalid
and weak instruments can lead to coefficient estimates that involve greater biases as
compared to results employing näıve OLS estimates. Thus, to investigate the robustness
of our results we formally examine the validity of our exclusion restrictions. We do
so by re-estimating Reg. 4 using a two-stage-least-square (2sls) approach and test the
validity and relevance of the two instruments under this approach.18 One must, however,
be cautious with respect to employing a linear approximation to model the selection
into a treatment. Therefore, the estimates obtained using this approach are not strictly
comparable to those obtained using the endogenous switching regression model reported
in the previous section. In the present context, our use of the 2sls approach is solely
for the purpose of testing our exclusion restrictions and not for the purpose of getting
unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. It is worth mentioning, however, that
the 2sls regression results we obtain are qualitatively similar to the results obtained using
the endogenous switching regression model.19 Last, it is of course not possible to compute
conditional and counterfactual loan spreads using the 2sls approach, which justifies the
use of the the endogenous switching regression model in the first place.
Table 9 reports the results of our validity and relevance tests. A necessary condition
for testing the validity of instruments is to have an overidentified model, that is, to
have more instruments that endogenous regressors. Our model is overidentified with
two instruments (the project country’s ratio of domestic arrangers to total arrangers,
and the project country’s level of financial development measured by private credit to
GDP), and one endogenous regressor (the domestic arranger dummy variable). Given
that a PF loan is often structured using more than one loan tranche, error terms at
the tranche level are unlikely to be homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. We first
report the Kleibergen-Pap rk LM statistic. The test is robust to heteroskedasticity, serial
correlation, and clustering. The instruments satisfy the rank condition since the statistic
rejects the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. Next, we turn to the
Hansen J statistic, which tests the joint hypothesis that the model is correctly specified
and the orthogonal condition is satisfied, and is robust to heteroskedasticity in the errors.
The exclusion restrictions are satisfied since the test of overidentifying restrictions does
not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
Last, we test for weak instruments using the Kleibergen and Paap rk Wald F-statistic,
which is also robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and clustering. The test
17We do not report any results for loan tranches in low-income countries since these tranches did not
involve any domestic arrangers in our sample.
18The endogenous switching regression Stata command movestay does not allow the user to test for
instrument validity and relevance. Thus, we run the 2sls Stata command ivreg2, which allows the user
to perform these tests.
19The 2sls regression results are available upon request.
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rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak.20 For completeness we also
report the Cragg-Donald F-statistic despite it being valid only under i.i.d. errors (Baum
et al., 2007).
5. Conclusion
Project finance has become an increasingly popular vehicle for channelling capital into
emerging markets. Thompson Reuters Deals Intelligence reported that the total value
of global PF transactions was worth $229.6 billion in 2017. Approximately $80.6 billion
(35%) of these deals were signed in emerging markets. This paper explores the pricing
effect of certification by domestic lead arrangers in PF loan syndication for 53 emerging
markets over the period 1998-2011. After controlling for the potential endogeneity of the
arranger’s selection, our findings indicate that domestic arranger certification reduces the
loan spread by 24 basis points on average. This amounts in our sample to a reduction
in the cost of debt of approximately $4.8 million per loan tranche. We show that this
impact is greater for loan tranches financing projects in (i) mining, water and sewage,
and oil and gas; (ii) the Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Indian subcontinent
regions; and (iii) lower-income countries. Overall, our findings demonstrate the economic
value of certification by domestic arrangers.
PF loans are a promising empirical laboratory for studying the importance of due
diligence and monitoring duties in syndicated lending due to their unique contractual
features. Our results suggest that, in the presence of information asymmetry between
project sponsors and participant lenders in the syndicate, certification by domestic ar-
rangers offers a superior mechanism to minimize the search, information and monitoring
costs associated with PF lending. Viewed more broadly, these results provide new in-
sight into an important function of homegrown or domestic financial intermediaries in
developing economies.
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Table 1: Description of the variables
Variable Description
Loan Spread Natural logarithm of the loan tranche spread over the base rate in basis points.
Domestic Arranger Dummy variable equal to 1 if a domestic financial intermediary is a MLA in the loan syndicate, 0 otherwise.
Maturity Natural logarithm of the loan tranche maturity measured in months.
Size Natural logarithm of the loan tranche size measured in million US Dollars.
Guarantees Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche has explicit political risk guarantees, 0 otherwise.
Refinance Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche refinances an ongoing project, 0 otherwise.
Currency Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche is in a currency other than the currency of the project country.
II Credit Risk Sovereign credit risk score. Ranges from 1 to 100. Source: Institutional Investor.
Private Credit to GDP Natural logarithm of private credit to GDP. Source: World Development Indicators.
Ratio of domestic arrangers to total arrangers Number of domestic arrangers divided by total number of arrangers at the country level.
Loan Type
Secured Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche is secured with a collateral, 0 otherwise.
Short-Term Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche is a short-term financing facility, 0 otherwise.
Credit Facility Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche is a credit facility, 0 otherwise.
Term Loan Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche is a term loan, 0 otherwise.
EXIM Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan tranche is an EXIM facility, 0 otherwise.
II Credit Risk*Year Dummies Interaction of II Credit Risk variable and year dummies.
Industry Dummies
Industry and Commercial Dummy variable equal to 1 for an industrial and commercial project, 0 otherwise.
Mining Dummy variable equal to 1 for a mining project, 0 otherwise.
Oil and Gas Dummy variable equal to 1 for an oil and gas project, 0 otherwise.
Petrochemical Dummy variable equal to 1 for a petrochemical project, 0 otherwise.
Telecom Dummy variable equal to 1 for a telecommunication project, 0 otherwise.
Transportation Dummy variable equal to 1 for a transportation project, 0 otherwise.
Water and Sewage Dummy variable equal to 1 for a water and sewage project, 0 otherwise.
Source: ProjectWare by Dealogic (unless otherwise stated).
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Table 2: Univariate comparison of loan tranches by type of arrangers
Loan Tranches Total Percent Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Spread (bps) 1,270 215.5 185.9 1 2,284
Maturity (months) 1,252 122 75 0.96 393
Size (US$ millions) 1,270 306,360.3 100% 241.2 403.6 0.32 6,787
Country credit score (1-100) 1,252 57.8 14.8 4.3 87.1
Country private credit to GDP (%) 1,262 61 43.6 8.1 159.6
Ratio of domestic arrangers to total arrangers 532 0.61 0.36 0.04 1
With domestic lead arrangers
Spread (bps) 526 214.9 232.7 10 2,284
Maturity (months) 518 147.9 82.4 2.4 393
Size (US$ millions) 526 158,301.6 52% 301 538 0.3 6,787.8
Country credit score (1-100) 522 65.8 12.1 18.3 87.1
Country private credit to GDP (%) 525 85.2 48.3 9.4 159.6
With foreign lead arrangers only
Spread (bps) 744 215.9 144.1 1 1,150
Maturity (months) 734 103.8 63.7 10 300
Size (US$ millions) 744 148,058.7 48% 199 263.4 1.3 2,185.5
Country credit score (1-100) 730 52.1 13.8 4.3 87.1
Country private credit to GDP (%) 737 43.6 29.5 8.1 159.6
Sample period: 1998 − 2011.
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Table 3: Distribution of loan tranches by projects
Loan Tranches Size (US$ millions) Percent Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Industry
Industrial and Commercial 64 17,511.4 6% 273.6 536 2.8 2,800
Mining 48 10,447.5 3% 217.7 208 10 950
Oil and Gas 205 79,764.3 26% 389.1 512.3 2.6 3,600
Petrochemical 106 39,100.7 13% 368.9 363.9 15 2,000
Power & Utility 296 65,827.9 21% 222.4 307.9 1.3 2,672
Telecommunication 175 30,757 10% 175.8 287.1 3.9 2,451
Transportation 195 50,546.8 17% 259.2 562.8 1.3 6,788
Water and Sewage 60 2,515.5 1% 41.9 39.5 1.6 154
Other 121 9,889.2 3% 81.2 147.5 0.3 1,314
Total 1,270 306,360.3 100%
Region
Indian Subcontinent 76 22,237.7 7% 292.6 442.9 10.3 2,672
Latin America 299 59,717.5 19% 199.7 209.5 2.6 1,314.4
Middle East 218 92,201.5 30% 422.9 555.7 1.3 3,600
South-East Asia 396 61,808.6 20% 156.1 403.3 0.3 6,787.8
Sub-Saharan African 52 11,298.2 4% 217.3 335.2 14.9 1,785
Western Europe 70 13,742.9 5% 196.3 289.6 4.8 1,639.3
Eastern Europe 159 45,353 15% 285.2 396.9 1.3 2,185.5
Total 1,270 306,360.3 100%
Country Income Level
High Income 516 154,628.6 50% 299.7 458.8 0.3 3,600
Upper Middle Income 509 98,796.4 32% 194.1 372.1 1.3 6,787.8
Lower Middle Income 239 50,761.6 17% 212.4 310.9 4.8 2,672
Lower Income 6 2,173.7 1% 362.3 585.3 80 1,550
Total 1,270 306,360.3 100%
Sample period: 1998 − 2011.
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Table 4: Distribution of loan tranches by type of arrangers
Loan Tranches Size (US$ millions) Mean St. Dev.
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Arrangers arrangers arrangers arrangers arrangers arrangers arrangers arrangers
Industry
Industrial and Commercial 35 29 14,200.9 3,310.5 405.7 114.2 680.6 189.2
Mining 10 38 2,065.9 8,381.6 206.6 220.6 222.3 207.2
Oil and Gas 46 159 26,830.5 52,933.8 583.3 332.9 819.4 365.3
Petrochemical 55 51 23,598.7 15,502.1 429.1 304 356.2 363.8
Power and Utility 98 198 31,292.4 34,535.4 319.3 174.4 429.3 210.4
Telecommunication 37 138 10,711 20,046 289.5 145.3 482 198
Transportation 134 61 43,231.5 7,315.3 322.6 119.9 663.7 137.4
Water and Sewage 32 28 1,062.1 1,453.4 33.19 51.9 29.4 47.1
Other 79 42 5,308.6 4,580.6 67.2 106.8 164 108.2
Total 526 744 158,301.6 148,058.7
Region
Indian Subcontinent 53 23 18,313.2 3,924.5 345.5 170.6 509.1 183.9
Latin America 44 255 12,798.6 46,918.9 290.9 184 301.3 185.5
Middle East 103 115 62,503.5 29,698 606.8 258.2 708.8 283.5
South-East Asia 259 137 43,606.2 18,202.4 168.4 132.9 484.9 160.1
Sub-Saharan African 7 45 1,464.3 9,833.9 209.2 218.5 135 357.4
Western Europe 20 50 8,672 5,070.9 433.6 101.4 429.8 119.5
Eastern Europe 40 119 10,943.8 34,410.1 273.6 289.2 333.6 417.3
Total 526 744 158,301.6 148,058.7
Country Income Level
High Income 293 223 90,970.3 63,658.3 310.5 285.5 521 361.9
Upper Middle Income 151 358 42,684.2 56,112.2 282.7 156.7 621.9 173.3
Lower Middle Income 82 157 24,647.1 26,114.5 300.6 217.7 425.1 217.7
Lower Income 0 6 0 2,173.7 0 362.3 0 585.3
Total 526 744 158,301.6 148,058.7
Sample period: 1998 − 2011.
25
Table 5: Determinants of domestic arranger selection
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4
Maturity 0.073 -0.036 0.027 0.009
(0.081) (0.079) (0.085) (0.086)
Size 0.203*** 0.177*** 0.180*** 0.162***
(0.048) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
Guarantees -0.489 -0.549 -0.606 -0.572
(0.348) (0.426) (0.435) (0.425)
Refinance 0.127 0.115 0.110 0.128
(0.160) (0.159) (0.162) (0.161)
Currency -0.083 -0.181 -0.157 -0.132
(0.348) (0.272) (0.277) (0.294)
II Credit Risk 0.020*** 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Private Credit to GDP -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Domestic arrangers to total arrangers 6.262*** 6.294*** 6.303*** 6.249***
(0.984) (0.903) (0.904) (0.905)
Secured -0.102 -0.108
(0.370) (0.363)
Short Term 0.491 0.532*
(0.303) (0.304)
Credit Facility -0.002 0.024
(0.444) (0.444)




Constant -3.353*** -2.264*** -2.270*** -2.732***
(0.527) (0.568) (0.644) (0.784)
II Credit Risk*Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No No Yes
No. of observations 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227
Dependent variable: Domestic Arranger. Sample period: 1998−2011. Deal level clustered robust
standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Loan spread regression results for loans arranged by domestic arrangers
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4
Maturity -0.064 -0.053 -0.109** -0.119**
(0.049) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050)
Size -0.047* -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.069***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025)
Guarantees -0.181 -0.119 -0.058 -0.029
(0.343) (0.354) (0.326) (0.286)
Refinance 0.062 0.039 0.032 -0.007
(0.123) (0.117) (0.115) (0.109)
Currency -0.493*** -0.508*** -0.509*** -0.440***
(0.114) (0.102) (0.100) (0.106)
II Credit Risk -0.011* -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Secured -0.107 -0.53
(0.221) (0.227)
Short Term 0.008 -0.060
(0.185) (0.179)
Credit Facility 0.150 0.045
(0.260) (0.275)




Constant 6.495*** 6.880*** 6.863*** 6.846***
(0.390) (0.352) (0.421) (0.472)
II Credit Risk*Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No No Yes
ρ1 0.153 0.223 0.241 0.253
(0.130) (0.139) (0.133) (0.153)
No. of observations 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227
Dependent variable: Loan Spread. Sample period: 1998 − 2011. Deal level clustered
robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Loan spread regression results for loans arranged by foreign arrangers
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4
Maturity 0.034 0.040 0.016 -0.001
(0.052) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
Size -0.071** -0.083*** -0.086*** -0.079**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033)
Guarantees -0.080 -0.071 -0.053 -0.084
(0.100) (0.103) (0.103) (0.107)
Refinance 0.249*** 0.204** 0.172** 0.113
(0.093) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086)
Currency -0.258** -0.193* -0.151 -0.157
(0.130) (0.114) (0.112) (0.153)
II Credit Risk -0.001*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Secured -0.039 0.083
(0.149) (0.152)
Short Term -0.488*** -0.490***
(0.148) (0.149)
Credit Facility -0.285* -0.228
(0.162) (0.164)




Constant 6.081*** 6.376*** 6.640*** 6.256***
(0.295) (0.300) (0.305) (0.305)
II Credit Risk*Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No No Yes
ρ2 0.073 0.105 0.165 0.204
(0.189) (0.328) (0.421) (0.392)
No. of observations 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227
Dependent variable: Loan Spread. Sample period: 1998 − 2011. Deal level clustered
robust standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Impact of certification by domestic arrangers on loan spreads
Basis Point Impact
Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
All loan tranches -24 -10 -17 -44
By Industry
Industry and Commercial -55 -12 1 -76
Mining -99 -82 -66 -146
Oil and Gas -62 -31 -74 -77
Petrochemical -30 -24 -23 -34
Power and Utility -29 -25 -45 -66
Telecommunication -50 -41 -51 -52
Transportation 7 -1 17 21
Water and Sewage -83 -10 -41 -112
By Region
Eastern Europe -40 -38 -45 -54
Indian Subcontinent -71 -67 -81 -54
Latin America -99 -90 -130 -118
Middle East -31 -22 -28 -26
South East Asia -8 10 -8.2 -13
Sub Saharan Africa -112 -55 -144 -126
Western Europe 65 6 12 38
By Country Income Level
High Income -26 -12 -17 -20
Upper Middle Income -20 -19 -22 -49
Lower Middle Income -84 -61 -82 -116
Sample period: 1998 − 2011. All values are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Robustness tests results
Underidentification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 155.1
(0.000)
Overidentification test
Hansen J statistic 0.936
(0.333)
Weak instruments tests
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 644.5
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 520
p-values in parentheses.
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